

ROUTINE
RELEASED IN PART
ALERT B1, 1.5(D)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

P47

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 01 OF 07 140629Z
INFO: X(01) EAP (01) 14/0720Z A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)
ACTION SS-00

SS05253

SS05253

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 1001W 4CF2E2 140629Z /38
R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5264
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO 7186
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

TOKYO 04532 01 OF 07 140629Z
THE ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A WORKING COALITION WITH
THE KOMEITO AND DSP, PERHAPS ESTABLISHING A PATTERN
FOR THE 1990S.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPACT ON U.S.-JAPAN
RELATIONS, AMERICAN SUCCESS REAFFIRMED JAPANESE
CONFIDENCE IN OUR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE, BUT "DASHING"
HAS LEFT SOME SCARES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE IS A
GROWING THEME HERE THAT AMERICA'S WELCOMED SELF
CONFIDENCE MAY DEVELOP INTO ARROGANCE DIRECTED AGAINST
JAPAN. IN PURSUING OUR INTERESTS HERE, WE HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSIVENESS
AND FEAR OF ISOLATION IN THE WAKE OF THE GULF CRISIS
TO GAIN GREATER GOJ COOPERATION

 BUT WE NEED TO AVOID
AN OVERLY CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH THAT RISKS
PROVOKING A BACKLASH. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO ENHANCE
OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOJ ON REGIONAL ISSUES,
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC
PRESSURE HERE FOR JAPAN TO UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENT
INITIATIVES. END SUMMARY

SETTING

4. IN TERMS OF THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF JAPAN'S
POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY, THE GOJ'S ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE
APPROACH TO THE GULF WAR WAS NOT UNSUCCESSFUL;

-- JAPAN'S ACCESS TO OIL WAS NOT DISRUPTED, AND THE
PRICE EVEN FELL.

DA
RF
RM

J B1

EP
RA

PH
T1

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS DECAPTIONED

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O.12356; DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 068000

1-8- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WHILE NOT UNSUCCESSFUL BY THE STANDARDS
OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OF THE LAST FORTY FIVE
YEARS, THE GOJ'S ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE APPROACH TO THE
GULF WAR STIMULATED THE ALREADY EXISTING DEBATE HERE
ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD, NECESSARY
ADJUSTMENTS IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, AND THE ADEQUACY
OF JAPAN'S POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM TO HANDLE
THE NEW CHALLENGES. NO CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED, BUT
THE OBSTACLES TO A MATURE FOREIGN POLICY WERE
HIGHLIGHTED, INCLUDING ENDURING PACIFIST SENTIMENT AND
DISTRUST OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY, THE GAP BETWEEN THE
DESIRE FOR RECOGNITION AS A GREAT POWER AND
WILLINGNESS TO BEAR THE ASSOCIATED RISKS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE INADEQUACY OF JAPAN'S
BUREAUCRATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN DEALING WITH
CRISIS MANAGEMENT. JAPAN APPEARS TO BE DRAWING SOME
LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS: THE GOJ NEEDS TO DO MORE THAN
SEND MONEY BUT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON WHAT THIS

CONTRIBUTION SHOULD BE; JAPAN IS NOT A GREAT POWER OR
HUNGRY TO BECOME ONE, BUT IT NEEDS THE ABILITY TO DO
MORE THAN SIMPLY FOLLOW THE U.S. LEAD IN FOREIGN
POLICY; AND THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY HAS AGAIN
DEMONSTRATED ITS IRRELEVANCE WHILE THE LDP DISPLAYED
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2002 199405013

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE B1 TOKYO 04532 B2 OF B7 140630Z
INFO: X (B1) EAP (B1)

SS05254

ACTION SS-BB 140720Z AT DRF (TOTAL COPIES: B92)

TOKYO 04532 B2 OF B7 140630Z
DEMANDS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF
RESPONSIBILITIES; AND JAPAN'S DESIRE FOR A MORE
INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY.

SS05254

INFO LOG-BB ADS-BB /801W

4CF2F5 140630Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5265
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USHMISSION USHATO 7107
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

-- RESTRUCTURING THE POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM
TO ALLOW JAPAN TO DO MORE THAN REACT TO EVENTS AND
COME UP WITH "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR" RESPONSES.

BUT NOT QUITE READY FOR PRIME TIME.

6. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE GULF WAR ENDED WITHOUT JAPAN
REACHING A CONSENSUS ON ANY OF THESE BASIC ISSUES. IN
PART THIS FAILURE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO PECULIAR
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES,

AND, FOR
THE FIRST TIME, THE UPPER HOUSE IN THE HANDS OF THE
OPPOSITION. THE CRISIS, HOWEVER, BROUGHT TO THE
SURFACE MORE FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO A NATURE
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY:

-- PACIFIST SENTIMENT IN GENERAL AND DISTRUST OF THE
JAPANESE MILITARY IN PARTICULAR REMAIN VERY STRONG,
EVEN AMONG MANY SO-CALLED "CONSERVATIVES" IN THE LDP.

B1

B1

SECRET SECTION B2 OF B7 TOKYO 04532

E
X
D
I
S

EXDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

WHITE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
REVEALED GROWING SUPPORT AMONG THE JAPANESE PUBLIC FOR
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES AND FOR SOME JAPANESE
PHYSICAL PRESENCE; THERE WAS ALSO STRONG REAFFIRMATION
OF JAPAN'S "PEACE CONSTITUTION" AND OF CONTINUED

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL MARR JA IZ US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
-- JAPANESE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED AT NO POLITICAL OR
OTHER COST TO JAPAN.

-- JAPAN'S POST-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE REMAINED INTACT.

-- AND JAPAN'S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF \$13 BILLION
DOLLARS TO THE IMF AND THE FRONT LINE STATES (\$88 PER
JAPANESE CITIZEN) PROVED TO BE A BARGAIN IN TERMS OF
BENEFITS RECEIVED.

5. HOWEVER, THE GULF CRISIS AROSE AT A TIME WHEN
JAPANESE WERE ALREADY RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT JAPAN'S
ROLE IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD AND SERVED AS A
CATALYST TO THIS DEBATE, RAISING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES,
SOME OF WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED SINCE THE END OF
THE WAR. THESE ISSUES INCLUDED:

-- THE CONTINUED EFFICACY OF JAPAN'S RENUNCIATION OF
ANY MILITARY ROLE BEYOND TERRITORIAL SELF-DEFENSE IN A
WORLD MOVING TOWARD COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND THE ROLE
OF THE MILITARY IN JAPANESE SOCIETY.

-- DEFINING AND BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A JAPANESE
CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEYOND
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

-- FINDING A NEW EQUILIBRIUM IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS
TO REFLECT THE SHIFT IN THE ECONOMIC BALANCE, AMERICAN

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 03 OF 07 140631Z
INFO: X(01) EAP(01)

SS05255

----- 140720Z A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)
ACTION SS-00

TOKYO 04532 03 OF 07 140631Z

SS05255

LEAVING LITTLE TIME FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT. RELEVANT
MOFA OFFICE DIRECTORS STAYED IN THE BUILDING ROUND THE
CLOCK FOR DAYS ON END.

B1

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 0001W

4CF386 140631Z /38

WHILE IN
REALITY THE MINISTRY ENDED UP RELYING ON CNN, LIKE THE
REST OF US.

B1

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5266
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USHATO 7108
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

-- THE DIET DEBATE CONTRIBUTED ONLY MARGINALLY TO THE
POLICY PROCESS. THE OPPOSITION TRIVIALIZED THE ISSUES
BY FOCUSING ON FINE-POINTS OF LAW, AND THE GOVERNMENT
STAYED LARGELY ON THE DEFENSIVE, SEEKING TO AVOID ANY
MISSSTATEMENTS THAT COULD DISRUPT PROCEEDINGS, THEREBY
MISSING THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE DEBATE TO EDUCATE
THE PUBLIC ON THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES
AT STAKE. MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY BELONGS TO THE
RIGID PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES BUILT UP OVER THE FORTY
YEARS OF SINGLE PARTY RULE AND TO THE BUREAUCRATIC
MENTALITY WITH WHICH THE GOJ, THE LDP, AND THE

OPPOSITION HAVE TRADITIONALLY APPROACHED ISSUES.

LESSONS LEARNED

7. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WITH ANY CONFIDENCE WHAT
WILL BE THE LONG TERM IMPACT, IF ANY, OF THE GULF
CRISIS ON JAPAN, BUT WE OFFER THESE PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS ON THE LESSONS JAPAN IS DRAWING FROM THE

E
X
D
I
S

E.O.12356: DECL:ODDR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
NON-ININVOLVEMENT OF JAPAN IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
ABROAD. INDEED, A FEW DAYS AFTER THE END OF THE
CONFLICT IN THE GULF, THE LDP, KOMEITO, AND DSP
RECONFIRMED THEIR EARLIER UNDERSTANDING THAT THE
"PEACEKEEPING FORCE" LEGISLATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO
THE DIET THIS SPRING WOULD RULE OUT THE PARTICIPATION
OF ACTIVE-DUTY SELF DEFENSE FORCE MEMBERS.

-- A LARGE GAP WAS REVEALED BETWEEN JAPAN'S DESIRE FOR
RECOGNITION AS A GREAT POWER AND ITS WILLINGNESS AND
ABILITY TO ASSUME THESE RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
WITHOUT COMPELLING ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT STAKE (IRAQ'S
INVASION OF KUWAIT WAS NOT SEEN HERE AS PUTTING AT
RISK JAPAN'S ACCESS TO OIL), NEITHER THE POLITICAL NOR
THE BUREAUCRATIC LEADERSHIP COULD OVERCOME THE
INCRIMED HABITS OF A MIDDLE-RANKING POWER SEEKING TO
MINIMIZE RISKS AND MAKE NO ENEMIES. OPPORTUNITIES FOR
DRAMATIC INITIATIVES (E.G., DISPATCH OF NON-MILITARY
PERSONNEL, QUICK DISBURSEMENT OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT)
WERE LOST TO CAUTION IN THE BUREAUCRATIC, POLITICAL,
AND BUSINESS COMMUNITIES.

-- JAPAN'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROVED TOTALLY
INADEQUATE. EMERGENCY CABINET MEETINGS WERE HELD

REGULARLY WITH NO REAL AGENDA, SIMPLY TO GIVE THE
APPEARANCE OF ACTION. CABINET MEMBERS AND SENIOR
BUREAUCRATS WERE KEPT TIED UP ALL DAY IN STERILE DIET
SESSIONS AND THEN RETURNED TO THEIR OFFICES IN THE
EVENING TO REVIEW MATERIAL FOR NEXT DAY'S SESSIONS.

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 04 OF 07 140631Z
INFO: X (01) EAP (01) SS05257

ACTION SS-08 140721Z A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)

INFO LOG-08 ADS-08 /001W 4CF311 140632Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5267
INFO RUEH8K/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BOHN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USHATO 7109
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

E
X
D
I
S

EXDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
LAST SEVEN MONTHS:

-- JAPAN NEEDS TO DO MORE THAN SEND MONEY. WHILE THE VALIDITY OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR COMMITMENT NOT TO SEND MILITARY FORCES ABROAD TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT HAS NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED, THERE IS A WIDESPREAD FEELING HERE THAT JAPAN CAN NOT SIMPLY BUY FRIENDS WITH AID, AND FINANCE THOSE WHO ARE DOING THE DIRTY AND DANGEROUS WORK INVOLVED IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON EXACTLY WHAT TASK JAPAN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE ABROAD, BUT FAVORITE SUGGESTIONS INCLUDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.N. PEACE KEEPING ACTIVITIES, PROVIDING MEDICAL TEAMS TO CRISIS AREAS, AND HELP IN MOVING REFUGEES FROM AREAS OF CONFLICT. AT THIS STAGE ONLY LIP SERVICE IS BEING PAID TO THESE IDEAS, BUT THE UPCOMING DEBATE ON THE NEW PEACE COOPERATION LAW WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO FLESH OUT SOME OF THESE PROPOSALS. MOFA OFFICIALS ARE LOOKING AT A U.N.-SUPERVISED CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT AS THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY FOR GOJ INVOLVEMENT IN PKO ACTIVITIES.

-- JAPAN IS NOT A GREAT POWER OR HUNGRY TO BECOME ONE. DESERT SHIELD/STORM WAS A VIVID REMINDER THAT

FOR ALL ITS ECONOMIC PROWESS, JAPAN IS NOT IN THE GREAT POWER LEAGUE. THE LEADERSHIP, DETERMINATION, DIPLOMATIC SKILL, AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY DISPLAYED BY THE U.S. STUNNED MANY JAPANESE WHO WERE BEGINNING TO EQUATE OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH AN OVERALL DECLINE

TOKYO 04532 04 OF 07 140631Z
OF AMERICAN STRENGTH AND WILL. THERE IS RENEWED RECOGNITION HERE THAT FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE JAPAN CANNOT MATCH OUR ABILITIES IN ANY OF THESE AREAS NOR SHOULD IT TRY TO DO SO. WHILE WE STILL HEAR TALK OF JAPANESE ASPIRATIONS FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ON THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, THESE VOICES ARE MORE HESITANT THAN A FEW MONTHS AGO.

SS05257..

-- JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IS INADEQUATE. THERE IS A WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION THAT THE GOJ WAS CAUGHT OFF-GUARD BY THE GULF CRISIS, PROVED INCAPABLE OF DEVELOPING ITS OWN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AS IT EVOLVED, AND CAME UP WITH NO POLICY RESPONSE OTHER THAN FOLLOWING THE U.S. LEAD. WHILE THIS POLICY PROVED TO BE THE CORRECT ONE IN LIGHT OF OUR SUCCESS, JAPANESE BUREAUCRATS, POLITICAL LEADERS, AND MEDIA COMMENTATORS ARE CHAGRINED AND FRUSTRATED BY THE GOJ'S CLEAR LACK OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND FORMULATION. THIS FRUSTRATION MAY BE MANIFESTED IN

[REDACTED] AND INCREASED PRESSURE FOR "INDEPENDENT" FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER AREAS (E.G., INDOCHINA).

-- THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY DEMONSTRATED (AGAIN) ITS INABILITY TO PUT FORWARD POLICIES RELEVANT TO MODERN

JAPAN AND SAW ITS SUPPORT RATE DROP FROM 20% BEFORE THE CRISIS TO 10% AFTER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LDP DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A WORKING COALITION WITH THE KOMEITO AND DSP TO PASS THE \$9 BILLION CONTRIBUTION, PERHAPS ESTABLISHING THE PATTERN FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF JAPANESE POLITICS IN THE 1990S.

IMPACT ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

B1

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

REF ID: A111111 UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 05 OF 07 140632Z
INFO: X(01) EAP(01)

SS05261

SS05261

ACTION SS-08 140721Z A3 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)

INFO LOG-08 ADS-08 /001W

4CF321 140632Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5268
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BOHN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO 7110
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

9. OF MORE IMPORTANCE IS THE GROWING THREME HERE THAT AMERICA'S WELCOME NEW SELF-CONFIDENCE MAY TURN TO ARROGANCE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES, UNCONSTRAINED BY THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCES TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET UNION IN A "UNI-POLAR WORLD" AND FRIGHTENED BY JAPAN'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGE, WILL NOW "TURN ITS GUHS" TOWARD TOKYO. THE JAPANESE RECOGNIZE THAT ITS STILL LARGE TRADE IMBALANCE, BILATERAL PROBLEMS IN SUCH AREAS AS CONSTRUCTION AND SEMICONDUCTORS, ITS FAILURE TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AT THE URUGUAY ROUND, AND ITS CONTINUED COMPETITIVE EDGE IN A WIDE RANGE OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS INCLUDING AUTOKOBILES, PROVIDE AMPLE AMMUNITION. MANY OF OUR JAPANESE CONTACTS AND MANY IN THE MEDIA ALREADY SEE CLEAR SIGNS OF A SOURING OF THE AMERICAN MOOD TOWARD JAPAN IN THE BELITTLED BY THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PRESS OF JAPAN'S \$13 BILLION CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF EFFORT; NEW U.S. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS SHOWING JAPAN AS THE MAJOR THREAT; AND THE ALLEGED LACK OF ATTENTION PAID TO JAPAN BY AMERICAN LEADERS DURING AND AFTER THE GULF WAR, INCLUDING REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANNED VISIT TO TOKYO WILL NOW BE DELAYED UNTIL FALL.

PURSUING OUR INTERESTS

10. WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSIVENESS AND SENSE OF INADEQUACY ABOUT ITS PERFORMANCE

BUT AN OVERLY CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH RISKS PROVOKING AN UNPRODUCTIVE BACKLASH. TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE WE WILL NEED TO LAY OUT CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND AVOID INCHOATE

E
X
D
I
S

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL:ODDR
TAGS: PREL MARR JA IZ US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
8. THE IMPACT OF OUR SUCCESS IN THE GULF WAR ON
U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS HAS BEEN MIXED. ON THE POSITIVE
SIDE, THE UNITED STATES PROVED TO BE THE "ONLY GAME
IN TOWN," AND REAFFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO
COME TO THE AID OF FRIENDS ABROAD, A GREAT REASSURANCE
TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF JAPANESE WHO FIND COMFORT IN
THE U.S. ORBIT, AND A USEFUL REMINDER TO THE FEW
OTHERS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR STRATEGIC
OPTIONS. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE "DASHING" FROM THE
CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA OF THE LAST SEVEN
MONTHS OVER JAPAN'S INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE GULF,
WHILE VIEWED BY MANY JAPANESE AS JUSTIFIABLE
CRITICISM, HAS ALSO FUELED RESENTMENT HERE. MANY
BUREAUCRATS AND CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERS
COMPLAINED ABOUT PERCEIVED U.S. INSENSITIVITY TO THE
COMPLEXITIES OF JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS,
PARTICULARLY WITH THE UPPER HOUSE IN OPPOSITION HANDS,
THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOJ TO MOVE QUICKLY.
OTHERS, MOSTLY IN THE MEDIA AND OPPOSITION, COMPLAINED
ABOUT AMERICAN "HIGHHANDESS" IN UNDERTAKING
UNILATERAL ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN AND
THEN ASKING THE JAPANESE TAXPAYER TO PICK UP A LARGE
PERCENTAGE OF THE TAB. THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORT AS EMBODIED IN THE UNSC

RESOLUTIONS AND OUR SUCCESS HAS LARGELY MITIGATED
THESE NEGATIVE ASPECTS, BUT THERE REMAIN CORNERS OF
SHOLDERING RESENTMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE FOREIGN
POLICY BUREAUCRACY.

B1

REF ID: A111111 UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

B1

ROUTINE

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 06 OF 07 140633Z
INFO: X(01) EAP(01) 140721Z A1 DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)
ACTION SS-08

SS05264

INFO LOG-08 ADS-08 /001W
-----4CF331 140633Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5269
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USHATO 7111
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

TOKYO 04532 06 OF 07 140633Z

SS05264

B1

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

E
X
D
I
S

EXDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC
HONOLULU
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL:QADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, JA, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
"DEMANDS" THAT COULD FEED THE GROWING PERCEPTION HERE
THAT THE U.S. IS MORE INTERESTED IN CATHARSIS THAN
ACHIEVING CONCRETE RESULTS.

11. WE ALSO NEED TO DEVOTE CLOSE ATTENTION TO TRYING
TO ENSURE GOJ FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES IN AREAS OF
MAJOR INTEREST TO US -

B1

B1

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INCOMING

ALERT

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04532 07 OF 07 140633Z
INFO: X(01) EAP (01)

SS05265

TOKYO 04532 07 OF 07 140633Z

SS05265

ARMAGOST

140721Z AI DRF (TOTAL COPIES: 002)

ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001W

4CF33E 140633Z /38

R 140627Z MAR 91
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5278
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BOHN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO 7112
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 07 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC

HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL: MARR: JA: IZ: US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND

WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY SURPRISES ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, SUCH AS A MAJOR CHANGE IN TERMS FOR NORMALIZATION WITH MOSCOW; BUT WE CAN EXPECT A TENDENCY FOR MORE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVES ON ASIAN ISSUES AND PERHAPS TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR BEST STRATEGY IS TO BRING THE GOJ AS FULLY INTO THE TENT AS POSSIBLE THROUGH ENHANCED WORKING LEVEL EXCHANGES, ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND REGULAR POLICY-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS.

12. IN SUM, WE HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECTION OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND TO POINT JAPAN'S FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN DIRECTIONS SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. INTERESTS IF WE DEVOTE THE TIME NECESSARY FOR CONSULTATIONS AND IF WE GIVE THE GOJ SOME ROOM FOR MANEUVER WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ACHIEVING SHARED OBJECTIVES. AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL RUN REAL RISKS OF PUSHING THE

JAPANESE OFF IN A MORE INDEPENDENT DIRECTION IF WE DO NOT GIVE THEM A FULL PLACE AT THE TABLE: WHETHER THEY DESERVE IT OR NOT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO DATE.

B1

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu